2. Consider the following game that is playedTtimes. First players move simultan

2. Consider the
following game that is playedTtimes. First players move simultaneously and
independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the
other player in the first play and given this they play it again and so on.
The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the
Tplays of
the game.a b cA 32 52 11B 26 44 13C 12 02 23(a) How many
subgames are there ifT= 3?(b) What is the
smallest value ofTfor which it possible forBandbto be
played in the first play of the game in a subgame perfect equilibrium even
though(B b)is not aNash equilibrium in
the payoff table above. (For example is it possible forT= 2 T= 3T= 4 T= 5?)